Are We Living In Nick Bostrom’s Speculation: различия между версиями

<div style="text-align:center;">Danila Medvedev</div>

= I.         Introduction =

= II.      Overview of the original article =

In the first part of the paper (The Assumption of Substrate-Independence), Bostrom describes the prerequisites for the simulation argument. He first outlines the assumption of substrate-independence, the idea that “it is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon-based biological neural networks inside a cranium” and “that mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical substrates” [1]. Although no references are provided and the issue is not discussed at length, it appears consistent with current scientific paradigms in the computer science and biological sciences. There have been some opposition to this idea from Roger Penrose [7] and a few other authors, who suggested that consciousness is possible because of specific quantum mechanisms in the human brain that cannot be reproduced on other substrates, but these ideas are not accepted by most of the scientists in these fields.

= III.    Calculation errors in the original paper =

One minor error in the formulas concerns a possibility of infinite number of civilisations. Frank Tipler [10] have shown how infinite computational capacity can be possible near the Omega Point, a hypothetical point prior to the Big Crunch (collapse of the Universe). Other scientists [16] extended this theory to the possibility of thermal death of the Universe (another possible outcome — the infinite expansion). If infinite computational capacity is possible, all variables used in the main formula (&nbsp;''fP'', [[Image:image004.gifImage6.png|top]]&nbsp;and [[Image:image006.gifImage7.png|top]]) are invalid. This does not invalidate the simulation argument, as the formula can easily be expanded to cover the case of infinite number of simulations, but it might affect some of the corollary arguments. A stronger objection is the possibility of multiple universes in reality (not being simulations) or multiple human civilisations in the base physical universe. This leads to a wide range of possibilities, such as:* The posthuman stage will only start after most of the human civilisations on different planets meet together (see below the arguments about posthuman stage being in the far future). This allows a larger number of real humans than in the case of one real civilisation and the same number of simulated realities.  

Another aspect of using average values that Bostrom ignores is that different civilisations are in different positions. If additional assumptions listed above are valid (especially the one about decreasing complexity of nested simulations), then those civilisations that are “deeply” simulated (simulated in a simulation in a simulation etc.) are less likely to reach a posthuman stage (and therefore run simulations themselves). In this case, using an average value of ''fP'' is misleading, because there can be observable signs in the world indicating that the civilisation is likely to be deeply simulated. We can speculate that our ability to think about creating simulations is an indicator that we are closer to reality (how close and whether we actually are in reality is, of course, uncertain). Thisisanargument (althoughnotadecidingone) againstindifferenceprinciple.

Special attention must be paid to calculating the number of individuals with human experiences ([[Image:image007.gifImage8.png|top]]). It is possible that even though the raw number of simulated people is large, the number of unique simulated people will be much smaller. There is also a possibility that a significant fraction of simulated people is fundamentally different from us by lacking self-consciousness.

The consequences of this possibility for the simulation argument are not obvious. It is not clear whether these people should be regarded as individuals or simply as instances of one individual. In the latter case the total number of simulated individuals ever can be comparable with the number of real individuals in the base reality. This in turn means that ''fsim'' can attain a large value, such as 0.5.

[[Image:image009.gifImage9.png|top]]&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (1)

where ''fP'' — is the fraction of all human-level technological civilisations that survive to reach a posthuman stage, [[Image:image010.gifImage10.png|top]]&nbsp;— is the average number of ancestor-simulations run by a posthuman civilisation and [[Image:image011.gifImage11.png|top]]&nbsp;— is the average number of individuals that have lived in a civilisation before it reaches a posthuman stage.

Bostrom claims that ''fsim'' — is “the actual fraction of all observers with human-type experiences that live in simulations” [1], but he is obviously mistaken. The formula, as it is written, makes practically no sense. The numerator is equal to the average number of people simulated by one civilisation and not to the total number of simulated people (by all civilisations in the metaverse). The denominator makes no mathematical sense but it is similar to the average number of people living in a civilisation and one level below (in simulations run in this civilisation). Evidently, the value of ''fP''[[Image:image012.gifImage12.png|top]] will usually be very close to 1, because

[[Image:image014.gifImage13.png|top]]&nbsp;and [[Image:image016.gifImage14.png|top]]

Therefore the value of ''fsim'', calculated using the formula (1), will be in most cases extremely close to 0.5, which obviously contradicts Bostrom’s conclusions.

[[Image:image018.gifImage15.png|top]]&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (2)

The next problem is that the [[Image:image019.gifImage16.png|top]]&nbsp;in the denominator of the formula (1) is a wrong value for the number of individuals that have lived in a ''base civilisation ''before it reaches a posthuman stage. This is a specific number that has nothing whatsoever in common with the average value for all civilisations in the metaverse. Therefore the next change is a replacement of [[Image:image020.gifImage17.png|top]]&nbsp;with the new variable ''Hbase'', the number of people that lived in the base civilisation before it reached the posthuman stage:

[[Image:image022.gifImage18.png|top]]&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (3)

A similar problem is that the number of simulations that the base civilisation runs is probably different from the average as well. An additional variable ''Nbase'' should be added. Assuming that the number of individuals in the first-level simulations is similar to the average for the simulations, the following change should be made:

 

This formula is more correct than the one suggested by Bostrom.However, even with all these changes there is still one fundamental problem with the formula. The ''fP'' variable is completely irrelevant for the base civilisation. As will be shown later, the base civilisation is governed by different laws than the simulated civilisations. Since the transition to the posthuman stage by the base civilisation is a non-repeating event, whose outcome is already determined (although it usually cannot be obtained from within a simulation) and which directly corresponds with the nature of the reality (existence of the metaverse). With regards to the base civilisation, instead of ''fP''probability a different variable have to be used that takes on the values of 0 (base civilisation reaches the posthuman stage and, if ''Nbase''>0, the metaverse exists) and 1 (base civilisation does not reach the posthuman stage, there is no metaverse and we live in the real world).

It therefore makes sense to examine the probable reasons that may cause simulated civilisations to be unable to run their own simulations or become posthuman. There are several such reasons possible.# It might be too expensive to run a nested simulation (running nested simulations can increase the computational cost of the first-level simulation very quickly).  

= IV.   Reasoning errors in the original paper =

If we do not live in a simulation, the whole logic of using ''fI'' or ''fP'' is invalid, because ''fsim'' is precisely zero. We know that we do not run any simulations and therefore whole argument is flawed. This is a common logical fallacy, known as a circular reasoning<ref>An argument that uses circular reasoning (also known as “begging the question”) makes a conclusion based on material that has already been assumed in the argument.

</ref>. It was used, for example, by Rene Descartes to construct an argument that God exists, known as the Cartesian Circle [3].

We can conclude that all probabilities used (explicitly or implicitly) in the simulation argument, including the probability of our own particular experiences being “implemented ''in vivo'' rather than ''in machina''” [1], depend on the qualities of the base civilisation and thus on whether we are the base civilisation or not.

If we live in a simulation, then we do not define the rules of the metaverse. Then any arguments such as “there are certainly many humans who would like to run ancestor-simulations if they could afford to do so” [1] are flawed. The moral, the laws of nature, the concepts of consciousness, everything is defined by the original civilisation. And if we are not it, there is no way we can be sure about anything in the metaverse.

There may be some possible ways to determine the nature of the metaverse or to test whether we are in a simulation or not from within a simulation. But it is also possible that such information can only be introduced to our world externally (or cannot at all if we are living in a real world). This is closely related to the idea of auto-reference or the ability to independently and clearly perceive yourself. A detailed explanation of the issues related to auto-reference can be found in Gödel, Escher, Bach. The Eternal Golden Braid by Douglas Hofstadter [5].

Another important implication of the scientific approach is that untestable hypotheses should be ignored. S. Novella [13] asks “What can a scientific sceptic say about such claims? Only that they are outside the realm of science, and that science can have only an agnostic view towards untestable hypotheses.” For this reason whether we live in a simulation or not should be a matter of personal belief, not scientific enquiry, unless additional evidence is uncovered.

= V.      Arguments against the simulation hypothesis =

Bostrom says “[the] simulation argument works equally well for those who think that it will take hundreds of thousands of years to reach a “posthuman” stage of civilisation”. But this is not the case. The development of posthuman civilisation in the base reality may take much longer than in a simulation, for example because all simulations have accelerated scientific and technological development for convenience of the observers. If that is the case, the ''HBASE'' value (the number of people who lived in the base civilisation before it reached the posthuman stage) can be much greater than [[Image:image025.gifImage20.png|top]]. That would force ''fsim'', to be much lower, making the probability of living in a real world much higher.

= VI.   Errors in The Interpretation of the Simulation Argument =

However, Bostrom ignores this and often incorrectly states that the simulation will be governed by some specific laws. For example, he says that in order for ''fI'' (the share of posthuman civilisations interested in running simulations) to be very small “there must be a strong convergence among the courses of advanced civilisations” [1]. Then Bostrom describes two possibilities — that posthuman civilisations will not run simulations for ethical reasons or that they will simply lose the desire to do it — but he says nothing about the possibility of parent civilisation prohibiting its simulations from running nested simulations.

But there are even stronger objections against these pseudo-religious ideas.# It is extremely irrational and plain silly to reward or punish your own creations (especially if they are essentially computer programs). The possible exception are experiments with artificial selection or training, but that has nothing to do with ethics and morals and criteria can be totally arbitrary.

# The idea of afterlife is somewhat logical, as explained above in the, but there are no reasons to believe that there will be any sort of reward or punishment. The posthuman beings capable of running a simulation are very unlikely to have an irrational and barbarous mentality necessary for that.  

 

= VII.Conclusion =

= VIII.         References =