Редактирование: Digital immortality (раздел)

=== Uploading ===
==== Non-destructive uploading ====
[[Non-destructive uploading]] refers to hypothetical methods, such as non-destructive high-resolution scanning of the brain for the purposes of [[whole brain emulation]].

Other methods include 'piece-by-piece- uploading of the brain functions into a non-biological substrate.
==== Destructive mind uploading ====
Many suggest that [[whole brain emulation]] is a convergent goal of immortalism. Whilst the [[A Taxonomy and Metaphysics of Mind-Uploading|taxonomies may be complex]], most transhumanists believe that a person could be '[[mind uploading|uploaded]]' to a machine at least with the destruction of the original. This is predicated on the need for high-resolution destructive 'scanning' of brain tissue.

This method has the advantage of being theoretically simpler to use with the damaged brain of a cryonics patient or indeed a relatively healthy person wishing to explore new levels of existence and mortality within a machine.

==== Continuity facsimiles ====
[[File:Arnold rimmer 1.jpg|thumb|Lister: Rimmer!  You're a hologram?! Rimmer: Yes.  That's because I'm dead.  Dead as a can of spam.  And it's  all thanks to you.]]
Once you (or a copy of you) are uploaded, a facimile or continuation of your original form may live on in many possible forms.

In Peter F. Hamilton's [[Commonwealth Saga]],<ref>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_Saga#Longevity</ref> all humans are backing up their personalities and memories most of the time to 'secure stores', allowing a reconstructed version of themselves to take their place if they die. This idea was explored earlier in [[Red Dwarf]], where the insufferable hologram [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnold_Rimmer Arnold J Rimmer] constantly complains about his original self being dead and unappreciated.

In [[Black Mirror]] episode [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Junipero San Junipero], a therapy simulation independently doubled as a vessel to house the consciousness of its users after their death.

A single personal continuity approach mostly sidesteps complex issues of whether 'you' can exist in multiple forms at once, arguing which is the 'real' you. See [[CGP Grey]]'s '[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nQHBAdShgYI 'The Trouble with Transporters'] for more on this problem.