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Are We Living In Nick Bostrom’s Speculation: различия между версиями
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== Circular reasoning == | == Circular reasoning == | ||
If we do not live in a simulation, the whole logic of using | If we do not live in a simulation, the whole logic of using <i>f<sub>I</sub></i> or <i>f<sub>P</sub></i> is invalid, because <i>f<sub>sim</sub></i> is precisely zero. We know that we do not run any simulations and therefore whole argument is flawed. This is a common logical fallacy, known as a circular reasoning<ref>An argument that uses circular reasoning (also known as “begging the question”) makes a conclusion based on material that has already been assumed in the argument. | ||
</ref>. It was used, for example, by Rene Descartes to construct an argument that God exists, known as the Cartesian Circle. | </ref>. It was used, for example, by Rene Descartes to construct an argument that God exists, known as the Cartesian Circle. | ||
One may object to this by saying that even if we do not run any simulations today, there might be simulations run in the future and they must be accounted for. Clearly such argument is without merit. Taking into account future simulation not only makes no sense (if we assume that we live in a real world, the simulation argument is useless), but also violates several important philosophical and physical principles. First, it violates the causality rules by allowing future events to affect our present world. Second, it ignores the fact that uncertainty principle in the quantum mechanics makes future effectively non-deterministic and it is impossible, neither practically, nor in theory to predict what simulations will be run by us in the future. | One may object to this by saying that even if we do not run any simulations today, there might be simulations run in the future and they must be accounted for. Clearly such argument is without merit. Taking into account future simulation not only makes no sense (if we assume that we live in a real world, the simulation argument is useless), but also violates several important philosophical and physical principles. First, it violates the causality rules by allowing future events to affect our present world. Second, it ignores the fact that uncertainty principle in the quantum mechanics makes future effectively non-deterministic and it is impossible, neither practically, nor in theory to predict what simulations will be run by us in the future. | ||
We can conclude that all probabilities used (explicitly or implicitly) in the simulation argument, including the probability of our own particular experiences being “implemented ''in vivo'' rather than ''in machina''” | We can conclude that all probabilities used (explicitly or implicitly) in the simulation argument, including the probability of our own particular experiences being “implemented ''in vivo'' rather than ''in machina''”, depend on the qualities of the base civilisation and thus on whether we are the base civilisation or not. | ||
== Observational bias == | == Observational bias == | ||